on attrition—always the game of the poor player.

This is how the proposition presented itself to them :—

> " The Allies have five men for every three the enemy can put in the field ; therefore, even if we spend four lives in extinguishing three, the foe must be beaten in the end."

The possibility never entered into the computation of these master minds that the survivors might sooner or later object to this method of " forming fours " by taking their turn in the slaughter house from which such multitudes of their comrades never emerged*

These arid strategists only saw that the units they commanded had for three consecutive campaigns marched into the death zone without flinching, and that to the very end of the terrible battles of 1916 they never faltered or hesitated, in spite of the fact that already 12 millions of them were dead or mutilated. Why, therefore, should the survivors now shrink from the fate which their fellows had confronted with such fortitude and resignation ?

With each campaign, the opportunities for trying the policy of attacking the enemy where he was most vulnerable became bricked up by the *Danube Front* enemy, and had now narrowed down to *dosed to us* the extreme east and to the Italian Front.

Up till the autumn of 1915 the Balkan door was kept wide open by the Serbian Army, one of the best fighting units in the field.

The failure of the Dardanelles attack, the refusal to exploit the Salonika base, and the abandonment of Serbia bolted and barred that door : the defeat of Roumania and the impending collapse of Russia would soon eliminate the last possibilities of the Near East,